An unexpected contact on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a recruiter, probably a young woman, based in the Asian nation. The chance to earn around £20,000 on the side writing a small number of geopolitical reports for a firm from China peppered with confidential or privileged insights. Payment in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It may seem obvious, in this scenario, that an element about this approach would be amiss. However, China’s powerful Ministry of State Security continues to view it valuable to deploy headhunters to attempt this – leading MI5 to warn repeatedly about their activity online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a frequency of ten thousand over the preceding 30-month period, attempting to obtain political, industrial, defense and scientific classified information. But a new campaign aimed at elected officials and parliament has led the spy agency to take further action.
A spying warning was distributed on Tuesday via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economic experts, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Security Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the curious manner of UK security services, there was no official release of the protective guidance from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the agency knew its advisory document would become public once it was sent electronically out to parliament. Sharing it in the media helps the general population more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive purpose.
This warning has the impact of uncovering more information from in and around Westminster, although that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service aims for people in public life to recognize that simply because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency believed to have been responding to a particular event in the legislature, although the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his friend another person on a legal detail earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for the foreign power – a charge they rejected – but failure to successfully conclude a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to warnings that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and Beijing's Strategic Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a note of its successor: “Individuals involved in spying operations face substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” It is a crime if a person participates in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But Beijing is also interested in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the UK’s China policy on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being driven by parliamentarians.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s export information gathering methods and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, engaging 300,000 people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was occasionally assessed that “China have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate contacts over the extended period and at times even the agencies have struggled to distinguish between genuine connections and espionage. “China has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be useful,” the minister responsible a government official told MPs on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may result in someone quickly peripheral turning significant.
An alternative perspective to consider the continuous activities at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between China and the Western nations at a level below the level of outright war. China has stepped up its cyber operations, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon breach of millions internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in persistent efforts to identify covert sources on UK politics via digital means because it seeks to be provocative, to display power and because it has the capability.
